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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of freedom of artistic creation, and of its integral 
aspect at the boundaries of art, is both intriguing in theoretical terms and 
significant in virtually every age and culture. Limitation of freedom of 
artistic creation is an issue that crosses various paradigms, hierarchies of 
values and normative systems. Given the extent and multifaceted 
character of the problem, attempts to determine the boundaries of artistic 
freedom have been made in many fields of research, and therefore in the 
framework of different scientific disciplines, including the theory and 
history of art, aesthetics, art criticism, ethics, economics, theology or 
law, to name but a few, each of which with its own specific axiological 
and methodological context. 
The aim of this paper is to give an introduction to the interpretation 
of Article 73 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (“the 
Constitution” or “the CRP”), which provides for freedom of artistic 
expression.1  In particular, the focus is put on the constitutional basis for 
legally limiting the freedom of artistic creation in view of the axiological 
preferences (decisions) of the organic lawgiver as expressed in the 
preamble to the CRP.2  An emphasis on the axiological foundations of 
the law is of importance not only when one postulates a statutory 
limitation of artistic activity but also when one attempts to interpret the 
provisions already in place in this regard. The system of constitutional 
values seems to be the most universal key to a proper understanding and 
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a precise definition of any legal boundaries of creative activity. 
Jurisprudence assumes that all legal norms, including those limiting the 
freedom of artistic expression, are both the emanation and concretization 
of any axiological decisions of the organic lawgiver. A legal system is 
rooted in a system of values recognized as an axiological foundation of 
the legal order, and therefore, in order to correctly decode legal norms 
out of the statutes, as well as to initiate legislative changes in conformity 
with the requirements of the CRP, it is necessary to accurately identify 
the values that the legal system should pursue and secure. 
Almost needless to say, the difficulty in achieving the goal so 
outlined lies in the fact that any identification of the constitutional values 
made in the process of interpreting and applying the law is carried out, 
on the one hand, in the actual context of a pluralistic society, in which 
different worldviews and value systems compete with each other, and on 
the other hand, with a normative reference to Article 25(2) CRP, 
pursuant to which public authorities shall be impartial in matters of 
personal conviction, whether religious or philosophical, or in relation to 
outlooks on life.3 This difficulty gets further exacerbated by the growing 
radicalization of viewpoints in the public debate and in the dispute over 
anthropological, ethical, religious, and civilizational assumptions 
fundamental to the debate itself, which are also important criteria for the 
assessment of artistic activity. It seems that when manoeuvring on the 
level of law axiology, legal professionals have particular difficulty in 
confronting the theses of art theorists and art critics, especially where the 
latter refer to the method of deconstruction of traditional values, 
symbols, concepts, normative, and cultural paradigms as proposed by the 
post-modern humanities. The obligation of being worldview-impartial 
on the side of public authorities, when combined with the assumptions 
of deconstructionism, in the long-term threatens axiological nihilism and 
decision-making incapacity of public authorities. These difficulties only 
confirm that both the constitutional values and principles must be read 
integrally, and applied to legal settlements of disputes over the limits of 
freedom of art. 
II. ARTISTIC CREATION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL TERM
Article 73 CRP stipulates that the freedom of artistic creation and 
scientific research as well as dissemination of the fruits thereof, the 
freedom to teach and to enjoy the products of culture, shall be ensured to 
3. Id. at art. 25(2). 
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everyone.4 However, the organic lawgiver does not define the concept of 
artistic creation, which leaves one with the need to clarify the term in the 
doctrine and jurisprudence. The use, in any court proceedings, of court 
expert opinions in the field of artistic creation is problematic insofar as 
in the theory and history of art, aesthetics, art criticism and cultural 
studies diverse and sometimes diametrically different concepts of what 
in essence artistic activity is have competed with each other for decades. 
One of them is a classic, narrower concept, according to which the 
essence of art is to imitate nature and complement its shortcomings in 
the name of beauty, aesthetic values that is, and the role of the artist is to 
explore, experience, creatively reformulate and present ever new 
epiphanies of beauty. The function of art in this concept is to assist the 
recipient, through beauty, in getting answers to fundamental existential 
questions, in discovering and strengthening the essential, objective moral 
values present in man and culture, such as goodness, truth, justice, and 
love, which enable fulfilment of man as a personal being capable of 
knowing and choosing good for its own sake. By another concept, the 
one that predominates nowadays, the term “art” is an open-ended idea, 
which refers to the activity of human spirit unfettered by any outer 
limitations. Artistic activity is the self-defining exploration of the idea of 
art, being often an uncompromising critique of tradition, its vision of 
man and culture. Art in this concept is an autonomous and autotelic 
sphere, and at the same time a tool to deconstruct culture and denounce 
its idols, stereotypes, and habits. Underlying this approach to art, and at 
the same time justifying the activity of artists, is a philosophical 
assumption of relativism (cognitive and moral), a postmodern belief that 
there are no objective, universal and neutral criteria of cultural debate 
whatsoever. In the spirit of confrontation with the pre-existing aesthetic 
convention, innovative substitute values are elevated, such as intuition, 
conceptualization, improvisation, experiment, contestation, ostentatious 
denial, scandal, and the transgression of taboo, meaning deliberately 
trespassing the boundaries delimited by the most profoundly rooted 
social norms, whether moral, religious, or legal. 
So, which concept of the essence of artistic creation should take 
preference in the process of interpretation of the law? A stance can be 
found in the literature that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
artistic creation, which does not contain a legal definition of the matter 
that it protects, allows for opening the law to all phenomenal forms of 
contemporary art. By establishing the guarantee of freedom of artistic 
4. Id. at art. 73. 
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creation without specifying the scope of its subject matter, the organic 
lawgiver would thus explicitly waive the determination of its legal 
contours, which would demand that any related evaluative legal 
argumentation take a due account of autonomizing arguments. In other 
words, in accordance with the Constitution, art would be an autonomous 
good protected under the law. One should note, however, that artistic 
creation, which has its particular structure, or language, is in fact one of 
the kinds of social communication, so both the content and form of that 
communication (communication of the artist with the recipients of the 
work) is subject to social valuation, including a legal assessment. 
Artistic activity refers to the different systems of values within which it 
operates. One of the value groups is on the level of art studies, where 
artistic creation is rather autonomous. Art here defines itself and is not 
subject to external appraisal. Another normative level, external to the 
first one, is the system of legal norms, in which artistic creation, like any 
other activity undertaken in the social space, operates and also by which 
it is governed. The different normative systems cannot be identified with 
each other, as they derive from different sources and operate in distinct 
paradigms. The constitutional concept of artistic creation, which belongs 
to the legal system, should be interpreted not so much based on an 
autonomous evaluation by art critics and art theorists, but in view of the 
axiological assumptions and political principles resulting from the 
content of the Basic Law. 
III. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
In interpreting the notion of artistic creation in the perspective of 
constitutional values and norms, one should note the methodological 
differences that occur within the self-defining contemporary art (and, 
consequently, within art studies) and under the applicable law. To a 
large extent, contemporary art is based on the method of deconstruction 
of symbols and concepts relating to any pre-existing social values, 
specific to the post-modernist philosophy. The deconstruction of the 
traditional cultural binder increasingly often becomes a substantive 
justification, a formal assessment criterion and the promoted structure of 
a work of art. Aware of certain standards of conduct in public life, the 
artist deliberately confronts these to deconstrue their semantics. 
“Unleashing free”, transgressing taboos, striving to eliminate any 
external (social) and internal (moral) restrictions in the creative process 
is an essential leitmotif of contemporary art, being an important tool of 
the so-called counter-culture. 
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With reference to the system of moral and ethical values, the basic 
instrument of deconstruction is the claim of ambiguity of the concepts 
fundamental for an ethical evaluation, and populating these with further 
meanings. The outcomes are semantic humbugs, devaluation and 
relativization of the classic values. By tricking adversaries into an area 
of relativism, advocates of deconstruction argue that the concepts 
underpinning the moral order can be stuffed with any content. 
Simultaneously, the various interpretations of the concepts are to have 
equal cognitive power, and none of them can claim exclusivity. The 
legitimacy of referring in public debate to such value-carrying terms as 
dignity, beauty, truth, goodness, justice, and responsibility is 
consistently undermined. 
One should note, however, that the methodological assumptions of 
deconstructionism, admitted in contemporary humanities (especially 
philosophy and art studies) cannot be used in the process of determining 
the axiological and normative content of legislation. Interpretation of the 
sources of law is based on the assumption that the terms used by the 
legislator, as tools to identify the content of the applicable legal norms, 
have their coded but specific range of meaning (the signified), which 
only requires establishing. The law, with its specific method of 
enactment and interpretation, unlike the idea of deconstruction, seeks to 
clarify the concepts, construe definitions and precisely describe the 
signified. The principles of good legislation and recognized methods of 
interpretation require the utmost unequivocalness and substantive focus 
on delivering certain values which are axiological foundations of the 
legal system. Owing to a kind of conservative character on the levels of 
semantics and axiology, the law provides itself stability, interpretative 
potential and systematic continuity. On the contrary, post-modernism as 
a rule refutes the pre-existing research paradigms, hence any integration 
of jurisprudence with the humanities saturated with the idea of 
deconstruction is extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
Cultural changes can be depenalized, legalized or promoted on a 
legal level, but this is only by defining them and changing the law, 
which requires a broader social consensus, rather than by deconstruing 
concepts in the interpretation of normative acts. The legal system 
evolves along with culture but only by amendment, not a deconstruction 
of the concepts of legal language. In the interpretive process, an 
authority that applies the law cannot rely on a free, individualistic, 
arbitrary interpretation of terms, unfettered – as post-modernists say – by 
“the great meta-narratives”, because that authority would then create a 
legal norm instead of decoding it out of a provision. This would be 
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contrary to the principle of separation of powers. The authority must 
take into account the objectives, the axiological preferences (i.e. “meta-
narratives”) that the legislator relied on. In continental law systems, a 
legal act by essence is a barrier to arbitrary decisions by an authority that 
applies the law, and not an invitation to more or less free interpretive 
activity. With that approach, an authority that applies the law would then 
claim the role of the legislator, in violation of the principle of separation 
of powers, legality and the rule of law. 
The essential methodological differences make the method of 
deconstruction useless in the interpretation of the law. Therefore, any 
criteria of artistic creation based on post-modern assumptions are of little 
use in constitutional interpretation. The meaning of the concept of 
artistic creation should be derived immanently from the order of values 
and norms contained in the Basic Law. Thus, there may be kinds of 
activity considered artistic in the circles of art theory and art criticism, 
which do not coincide with the scope of the subject matter given to 
artistic creation in the CRP. If the legally guaranteed freedom of artistic 
expression is to take precedence over other forms of expression, then 
this activity must be harmonized with the constitutional values and 
norms. The guarantee of freedom of artistic creation cannot be a handy 
formula used to attack these values and norms. Freedom of artistic 
creation makes taking account of the axiology of the Constitution a 
must. 
IV. AXIOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF FREEDOM OF ARTISTIC CREATION
In an attempt to outline the axiological framework of freedom of
artistic creation, one cannot ignore the preamble to the Constitution. 
Though one cannot derive legal norms from the text of the preamble in 
the strict sense, its analysis, as the Constitutional Court held, may 
provide guidance, based on a true expression by the organic law-giver, 
as to the directions for interpretation of provisions of the normative part 
of the Constitution as originally intended.5 The preamble, in turn, 
identifies four basic universal values, i.e. truth, justice, goodness, and 
beauty.6 The emphasized universality of these values means that in the 
opinion of the organic lawgiver the concepts that express them carry 
objective moral content. They are relevant to the entire legal order, and 
therefore constitute a point of reference (evaluation) for the legal 
5. Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal] May 11, 2005, K 18/04 at 8 (OTK-A 
2005, No. 5, item 49). 
6. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, pmbl. 
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relationships of all citizens of the Republic. The map of constitutional 
axiology is made more precise by the emphasis in the preamble put on 
the values of culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in 
universal human values. Moreover, the organic law-giver links the 
freedoms of the individual to justice and social dialogue, and formulates 
the obligation of solidarity with others, combined with concern for the 
preservation of human dignity, which means, among other things, the 
rejection of the idea of class struggle. Freedom of artistic expression, 
which enjoys constitutional protection, is not alienated vis-a-vis the 
constitutional values and norms, and therefore it is not absolute or 
unlimited. The very notion of artistic creation is not at the same time 
indefinable or capacious enough to be able to justify an omission, 
neglect or breach of the axiological preferences of the organic lawgiver 
as expressed in the basic law. 
What follows is that artistic creation, the freedom of which is 
subject to legal protection, cannot be explained by an open-ended, 
autonomous definition, but should be referred to other constitutional 
values and norms, including–at the axiological level–to beauty, truth, 
goodness and justice, which the legislator considers the objective criteria 
of evaluation. Beauty is not recognized in purely formal terms (aesthetic 
terms) but in axiological terms, as corresponding to goodness, truth, and 
justice (beautiful is what is true, just, and good on the basis of 
constitutional axiology). Of course, these values should not be made 
instrumental by public authorities, as they were in modernism (a variety 
of idealism) and totalitarian systems rejected by the organic lawgiver, as 
projections of party ideology to be guarded by an institution of 
censorship. They should be read on the basis of cognitive realism from 
the perspective of the common good– that is, in conjunction with Article 
1 CRP.7 Thus, if artistic activity attempted to impose or promote anti-
values within the meaning of constitutional axiology, i.e. falsehood, 
injustice, evil, ugliness (understood axiologically), then such activity 
would not mean artistic creation whose freedom is guaranteed by the 
Constitution. Furthermore, no one could rely on that freedom if it were 
to justify the violation of human dignity, class struggle, or attack on 
culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation (that without 
additional reference to Article 53–freedom of conscience and religion, or 
Article 54–freedom to express opinions, including their limitations).8 
7. Id. at art. 1. 
8. Id. at art. 53-54. 
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V. STATUTORY BOUNDARIES OF FREEDOM OF ARTISTIC CREATION
Contrary to what one sometimes hears from people professionally
operating in the world of art, entertainment and media, one should note 
that the legal guarantees of freedoms and civil rights, including freedom 
of expression and artistic creation, also assume their limitations. 
Interdependencies between individual constitutional freedoms and rights 
imply the necessity of limiting them, so as to prevent the abuse of rights. 
Relying on the constitutional guarantee of a freedom or right does not 
allow one the freedom to interfere in another freedom or right. One of 
the foundations of constitutionalism is the principle of setting boundaries 
to the freedom of the individual where it encounters the freedom or right 
of another entity. The constitutional freedom of artistic creation is not by 
itself a legal basis to justify the artist’s violating the law. There is no 
reason to believe that freedom of artistic creation enjoys a special 
constitutional protection, a much stronger one than the other freedoms 
and rights, and takes precedence in the event of a conflict with the other 
rights and freedoms. One may not treat freedom of artistic creation as a 
key to open the boundaries of freedom in which this freedom is 
embedded. 
The constitutional guarantee of the protection of freedoms, 
including freedom of artistic creation, is a mandate addressed to the 
ordinary legislator to provide for guarantees of such freedoms in statutes 
governing the various spheres of life, and implies the determination of 
their boundaries in the form of statutory prohibitions or orders, taking 
into account the respect for and delivering on the constitutional 
axiology. Freedom of artistic expression is therefore subject to 
restrictions with regard to the provision of Article 31 CRP, and thus in 
order to determine its boundaries it is necessary to formulate and analyze 
the various norms contained in the legal acts of the statute rank.9 
The competence of the legislature to define the limits of freedom of 
artistic creation is confirmed by the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights. Under the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, public morality was decided to be a 
value which limits the freedom of art, for instance.10 The Court 
emphasized in this context that although one must not unnecessarily 
interfere with the freedom of expression, it is the wide margin of 
appreciation and the absence of a European concept of morality that 
allows the state to interfere with the freedom of artistic expression, if the 
9. Id. at art. 31. 
10. Müller v. Switzerland, 133 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 18 (1988).
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work is presented in a public place.11 The Court held, among other 
things, that if the work is without a reason and offensive to others, it 
does not gain legal protection.12 It appears also that the provision of 
Article 13 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
which stipulates that the arts and scientific research shall be free from 
restrictions, should be read in conjunction with the principle of 
proportionality, as set out in Article 52 (1) of the Charter.13 In this 
context, the freedom of art may be subject to restrictions with a view to 
protecting the public order or public morality. Moral argumentation here 
is of a particular nature, as it refers to the realm of tradition and cultural 
heritage of the Member States, due to the fact that there is no single 
European morality. Member States enjoy in this respect the power of 
assessment and the margin of appreciation, which lend legitimacy to the 
application of national measures restricting the freedom of art. It would 
be difficult to accept the view that the European legislator does not 
recognize any boundaries of freedom of artistic activity. The historical 
experience of Europe has shown that uncontrolled art may violate the 
limits of dignity and the freedom of others, and serve the escalation of 
violence and the emergence of social unrest. Suffice it to say that anti-
Semitism, also present in literature and art, was a path paved to the 
Holocaust. 
VI. CONCLUSION
At the heart of the debate on the boundaries of art there is the 
problem of reconciling two legitimate aspirations. The first one is the 
desire to respect and preserve the fundamental social values, protected 
by moral, religious and legal norms rooted in the culture of a society. On 
the other side there is the desire to respect the freedom of artistic activity 
and creative sovereignty, which, however, sometimes takes on a formula 
of not only uncompromising criticism of the pre-existing system of 
values, but of deliberate public trespassing of boundaries, violation of 
norms, and breaking of social prohibitions. With a view to protecting 
goods such as public order and safety, environment, public health, 
morality or the rights and freedoms of others, the legislator imposes 
statutory restrictions also on artists and organizers of artistic activity. In 
contemporary culture, this task is extremely difficult because of the 
11. Id. at 17-18.
12. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295-A Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 14 (1994). 
13. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 13, 52(1), 2010 O.J. C 83/02,
at 394, 402. 
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ideas of deconstruction of the traditionally recognized concepts, values 
and social norms penetrating the humanities as grown from post-modern 
philosophy. 
The point of reference for setting legal limits to freedom of artistic 
creation lies in the constitutional values that emanate from the four basic 
universal (considered objective) “mega-values”–that is, truth, justice, 
goodness and beauty–being the carriers of moral content corresponding 
to the axiological preferences of the organic law-giver. Beauty on this 
list is recognized axiologically as corresponding to the goodness, truth 
and justice within the framework of the other constitutional values and 
norms. This understanding of beauty is a clue to guide the interpretation 
of the constitutional term of artistic creation and the setting of the 
boundaries of free creative activity. The constitutional concept of artistic 
creation can be interpreted in neither an autonomizing nor a utilitarian 
(instrumental) manner, as it refers art to the system of universal values 
identified in the Basic Law. The legally guaranteed freedom of artistic 
creation, without a doubt, encompasses the possibility of using 
contemporary means of artistic expression recognized in art studies 
(innovation, conceptualization, shock), yet using them–if it is to be 
protected by the law–must fall within the scope of activities aimed at 
delivering on the constitutional values. 
Public authorities, generally,  should not interfere with artistic 
creation themselves and are obliged to protect artists against such 
interference from other entities, may, for the purposes of constitutional 
values, not particular ideological purposes, support financially and 
organizationally selected artistic projects. Such a policy does not 
discriminate against those artists whose activities are directed towards 
the deconstruction of the values preferred by the organic lawgiver. What 
is more, if an artist or organizer of art in the course of their artistic 
activities fulfilled the attributes of an offence, they may not, in principle, 
rely on the freedom of art as a circumstance legally justifying their 
behaviour. In the absence of any specific provision allowing the 
behaviour fulfilling the attributes of an offence within such activities, the 
artistic context of the act does not exclude the legal liability of the artist 
or the exhibitor of a work of art for trespassing the statutory limits under 
the law. 
